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## Exercise sheet 2

Exercises for the exercise session on 03/04/2017

**Problem 2.1.** Prove Theorem 1.19. from the lecture: A graph  $G$  is 2-edge-connected iff there exists an orientation of the edges of  $G$  such that the resulting directed graph is strongly connected.

**Problem 2.2.** Let  $G$  be bipartite with sides  $A$  and  $B$  and let  $A' \subseteq A$  and  $B' \subseteq B$ . Suppose that  $G$  contains matchings  $M_A$  and  $M_B$  that cover  $A'$  and  $B'$ , respectively. Prove that  $G$  contains a matching that covers both  $A'$  and  $B'$ .

**Problem 2.3.** Let  $G$  be bipartite and let  $U$  be the set of vertices of degree  $\Delta(G)$ . Prove that  $G$  contains a matching that covers  $U$ . Deduce that in particular every  $r$ -regular bipartite graph with  $r > 0$  has a perfect matching.

**Problem 2.4.** Let  $G$  be bipartite with sides  $A$  and  $B$  and suppose that each vertex  $v$  has a preference order  $\geq_v$  on its set of neighbours. Let us call a stable matching  $M$  *A-optimal* if each vertex  $a \in A$  is matched to its ‘best’ neighbour among all vertices that are possible as partners for  $a$  in a stable matching. (Formally: If  $ab \in M$  and  $ab' \in M'$  for some stable matching  $M'$ , then  $b \geq_a b'$ .) We define *B-optimal*, *A-pessimal* (worst possible for  $A$ ) and *B-pessimal* analogously. Prove that a stable matching is *A-optimal* iff it is *B-pessimal*. Furthermore, prove that every bipartite  $G$  has a unique *A-optimal* matching.

**Problem 2.5.** In the algorithm STABLE, if at some time  $a \in A$  has proposed to  $b \in B$  and  $b$  has not rejected the proposal (possibly only not rejected it *yet*), we call the proposal *open*. Consider the following variant of STABLE. In each step, we choose a vertex  $a \in A$  with no open proposals and let it propose to its ‘best’ remaining neighbour, or we choose a vertex  $b \in B$  with at least two open proposals and let it reject all but its ‘best’ suitor. The algorithm ends once no such vertices in  $A$  and  $B$  exist. By the same arguments as for STABLE, this variant produces a stable matching  $M$ .

Prove that  $M$  is *A-optimal* (and thus also *B-pessimal*), regardless of the choices that are made.

*Hint.* Consider the first time that some vertex  $a \in A$  is refused by its ‘best’ choice  $b$  among its possible partners.

**Problem 2.6.** A graph is called *transitive* if for every two vertices  $u, v$ , there exists an automorphism (a bijective map  $\varphi: V \rightarrow V$  for which  $xy \in E$  iff  $\varphi(x)\varphi(y) \in E$ ) that maps  $u$  to  $v$ .

Prove that every transitive graph with an even number of vertices has a perfect matching.